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24 November 1981

# Japan Report

(FOUO 67/81)

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

LDP FACTIONAL STRIFE UPDATED

Tokyo SHOKUN in Japanese Nov 81 pp 86-94

[Round-table discussion: "Who Will Come After Suzuki?" Anonymous participants (Dietmen)]

[Excerpts] [Question] What about the rumor of a change of government in November which has been whispered lately?

[B] It has already vanished like the dew.

[C] First of all, it is a distortion, no matter how interesting some try to make the story.

[A] It has become common knowledge that under various pretexts Zenko will serve out his term at least.

[C] Until November next year, right?

[Question] But what about the case in which Prime Minister Suzuki suffers an unlikely event like Ohira.

[D] By no means would Nakasone be agreed to.

[B] Right. I don't think Fukuda will be turned to either.

[D] In that case, perhaps Nikaido will be agreed on.

[A] It all depends on what the Fukuda faction does.

[B] Fukuda will not say OK to Nikaido.

[C] That isn't inevitable. The Fukuda faction would join if Shintaro Abe is made secretary general and then follows Nikaido.

[Question] Could the election be won with a Nikaido government?

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[C] If the election can't be won with a Nikaido government, it can't be won with either Nakasone or Fukuda. There is no reason why the election can't be won with Nikaido.

[Question] But if "dirty" government official Nikaido becomes prime minister...

[C] There are no politicians who would say he is dirty.

[Question] That may be so in the world of professionals, but from the view of the general voters, it would be distasteful for a dirty official to become prime minister.

[C] Yet, Kakuei Tanaka about whom that has been written so much is now the most popular with the people.

[B] Being popular and being supported are not the same thing. If Kakuei comes forth, people will be brought out, but the votes won't be brought in.

[C] When it is seen that Dietmembers for whom the election is more important than life are joining the Tanaka faction in great numbers like the feces of goldfish, it means he is popular with the people after all.

Inviting Kakuei's Popularity

[Question] In short, would you like to have Kakuei Tanaka come to give a speech supporting your campaign when you are campaigning for election?

[C] Everyone wants him to come.

[Question] But is the result clear from this past Tokyo metropolitan election?

[C] A metropolitan election is somewhat different. That is, the present executive committee wasn't very aggressive. Therefore, the Tanaka faction has taken responsibility for all the weak fellows. It is said that the rate of the Tanaka faction's wins was small but the Tanaka faction had the greatest number elected. It just says it took responsibility for doubtful fellows who were unable to have anyone care for them. If a public opinion poll were conducted now on who should be the next prime minister, the answer would be overwhelmingly for Kakuei.

[B] A questionnaire was given at the Surugadai Prep School on whom would you most like to hear. The first would be Kakuei Tanaka and the second, Ryoichi Sasagawa.

[A] He may place somewhere in a public opinion poll, but I don't think he would be overwhelmingly number one.

[C] No, no. There's no doubt he would be first, and I think he would be far ahead of the number two person.

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[Question] What is it about him that makes you have such expectations of him?

[C] His strong politics. Because of the present poor economic situation.

[Question] However, didn't Tanaka bring on extremely high prices of commodities, and that proved fatal to him?

[C] Didn't the people understand it wasn't Kakuei's fault but that Arab oil prices went up?

[Question] Oil prices went up but in addition, he incited a speculation craze with his "plan for the reconstruction of the archipelago" and that was reflected in the market.

[C] There is no other nation in the world but Japan where prices didn't go up that much even though 2 dollar oil went to 35-36 dollars. The people realized that.

[D] However, Mr. C., once there was certainly a cry, "Kakuei should come forth," when there was widespread economic depression, but recently we don't hear that. It is recognized that economic depression is not something related to the policies and judgment of one politician but is determined by the international state of affairs such as the Arab question.

[A] Well, Kakuei's popularity comes from the fact that politics is not very interesting right now.

[B] That's right. There is no other attractive politician.

[A] So, that is the responsibility of the new leaders. From the mid-40's to the late 50's there were politicians who bore the expectations of the people, such as Ichiro Kono, Yasuhiro Nakasone and Kakuei Ishida. But now there is no politician with such popularity with the people.

[C] Don't the people have the feeling that only Kakuei has the vigor to do what should be done for the country and speaks out, for example, on what should be the relationship with the opposition parties and what should the policies be.

[A] Once there were popular supra-partisan politicians in the opposition parties, such as Inajiro Asanuma. The present popularity of Kakuei is similar to a Inajiro Asanuma style popularity.

[B] That's right. On the other hand, it is also like the strength of Ichiro Kono. Unfortunately, there is not even one other person besides Kakuei.

Michio Watanabe, Lone Wolf

[A] In essence, I think it is Nakasone who should have the popularity now.

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[B] Somehow no popularity has gushed forth to him.

[A] Nakasone's popularity came in the mid 50's when he was a young officer.

[D] When he was a leader of the young men. Now that the handsome fellow with the young man's topknot has become bald, you can't very well call him handsome. (Laughter)

[B] About the time he was the leader of the young men, this man was not called an opportunist.

[A] He wasn't called that. He was someone who gave the image of being extremely militant.

[C] He was the most splendid when he was rampaging under Ichiro Kono.

[B] Next to Kakuei, isn't it Michio Watanabe who is the topic of barbershop political conversations?

[A] That's right. But won't the time come when the people gradually get tired if his talk is simply interesting? Where is the difference between Kakuei and Michio Watanabe?

[D] Watanabe doesn't have Lockheed! (Laughter)

[B] Kakuei Tanaka now has fallen from being "imperial adviser" to accused defendant, and that is the literary, or historical, narrative of the mutability of life. But in the case of Michio Watanabe, it is as though Hitotsubashi University is making the talk interesting.

[C] Michio Watanabe's popularity came from his seeking a quarrel with the medical association which was taboo; and as for where is Michio Watanabe's excellence, it is only his quarrel with the medical association.

[B] One more positive point of Michio Watanabe is that he appears on TV and speaks intelligibly on such subjects as public finance and medical insurance, and makes politics familiar to the people. Quarrels and commentaries ---those two points, right?

[Question] His services were greatly conducive to the zero ceiling decision in this special session on administrative reform.

[B] I think so too.

[C] But he is, after all, just a lone wolf. He is not a person who will move up. He is not someone who can gather together people and build up power. He is in the category of Monjiro Kogarashi and others; he won't be a Hidegoro Omaeda.

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[B] I don't think that's quite right. He always pulls together five or six people. For example, Hirofumi Muto and Ihei Ochi...

[C] But it is just because Michio Watanabe is finance minister that stray birds flock around accidentally. Nakagawa has far more of the character of boss.

[A] Oh yes, that's right.

Rokusuke Tanaka, Prominent Political Fundraiser

[C] Nakagawa waged his own flesh and blood in this past election; at any rate for 2 or 3 supporters.

[B] Compared to Nakagawa, isn't Watanabe too intelligent and cunning and causes others to exercise caution?

[C] Isn't it just the opposite. I feel Watanabe is a superior but ill-natured person; Nakagawa is quite the scoundrel but is kind-hearted. Therefore, although he won't be a Hidegoro Omaeda, he is somewhat like a Chuji Kunisada.

[D] Watanabe is too sharp. I don't think Nakagawa is smart, but somehow is dependable...

[A] The latter is preferable as a politician's disposition.

[C] Everything has gone too well for Michio; he has never stood in a place where the sun doesn't shine. Nakagawa was deprived of a possible role because he opposed Ohira.

[Question] What about his ability to raise political funds?

[C] If anyone would conquer the whole country with his ability to raise funds, it would be Rokusuke Tanaka.

[A] Is he that remarkable?

[C] Yes. In addition to that, this man is not especially skillful at speaking like Michio Watanabe or Ichiro Nakagawa, nor does he have any star-like qualities, but concerning his behind-the-scenes political power and the like, whether it is true or not, he has publicized that he set up two cabinets, the Ohira cabinet and the Suzuki cabinet. (Laughter)

[B] At any rate, that is because he pulls together no less than 50 Diet members.

[C] To look at him, he has no appeal at all. Watanabe has appeal in his own way; Nakagawa has appeal in his own way. Compared to them, Rokusuke Tanaka has new leader appeal neither in speech nor countenance. However, speaking of the role he performed in actually moving politics, aside from whether it



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is true or not, during the Ohira and Suzuki governments, he was at the scene where he can say, "I set up two cabinets." If he wasn't there, he couldn't even tell the lie. (Laughter)

[D] Concerning his ability to raise political funds, I think whether he can raise political funds or not will determine his future when he resigns as MITI minister.

[A] Isn't Watanabe himself setting up a new to gather in money by using his position as finance minister?

[B] I think Nakagawa's and Watanabe's ability to raise funds will probably continue even after leaving their posts, but in Rokusuke's case, won't he fall noticeable when he leaves his post?

[C] However, now it is only Rokusuke Tanaka who is collecting money and giving it to everyone in the Suzuki faction.

[D] I don't think that's true.

[A] At any rate, it is certain that Rokusuke Tanaka has started to stand in the new leader section since he became MITI minister.

[C] The order of our conversation is reversed but as for the new leader champions, they are Takeshita and Abe, after all. Watanabe, Nakagawa and Rokusuke Tanaka are below them. But it is simply because Rokusuke Tanaka and Watanabe are by chance in the most fortunate positions that they became subjects first, but if Watanabe and Tanaka step down as ministers, they would not have been subjects of our talks for an hour. On those points, Takeshita is now in the most unfortunate situation.

[Question] Takeshita once tried to take arms against Tanaka. Isn't his popularity low because that was unfinished?

[C] It is outrageous for him to have taken up arms. Without Tanaka, Takeshita doesn't exist. Noboru Takeshita has meaning because of the Tanaka faction.

[B] Supporting the generation change theory, Takeshita set up the neo-liberalism research society together with Shintaro Abe and Kiichi Miyazawa. That incurred Kakuei's wrath.

[D] That's why he was made to scrub the floor. (Laughter)

[B] But that neoliberalism research society was significant. It seems that both Tanaka and Fukuda held down that society in that format, but as a result, the new leaders became finance minister and chairman of the Policy Research Committee, and thus it can be said doors to various important posts were opened. Without that society, control by the elders, the so-called era of the influential political leaders, would have continued.

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Shintaro Abe's Favorable Terms

[Question] How about Ganri Yamashita or Tokusaburo Kozaka of the Tanaka faction?

[C] Such persons can in no way be new leaders. Ganri Yamashita is a made-up image. Kozaka is not even a topic of conversation within the faction.

[B] If some accident happened to Tanaka, up to 90 percent of the Tanaka faction would stay with Takeshita.

[C] No, it would be with Nikaido. If something happened to Tanaka and Nikaido, 90 percent would go to Takeshita.

[B] Almost no one would stay with Ganri Yamashita. Thirty percent would follow Kozaka.

[A] What about Kanamaru?

[B] He is Takeshita's guardian. Don't more than half of the 90 percent who would follow Takeshita idolize Kanamaru's virtues.

[C] At any rate, because Tanaka equals Takeshita, Takeshita cannot survive if he rebels against Tanaka. The way for Takeshita to survive is to earnestly and loyally serve Tanaka.

[Question] Tanaka is looking after Takeshita thinking he's an excellent fellow. As for those in the Tanaka faction, they pretend to be following after Takeshita because Kakuei is looking after him. But, should Tanaka have an accident, isn't there the possibility they would converge not on Takeshita but on another?

[C] Just the opposite. Although Takeshita was more or less given a cold shoulder by Tanaka, I think the majority was sympathetic to Takeshita.

[B] Therefore, it resembles when the Sato faction dissolved into the Tanaka faction and Fukuda faction, most went to Tanaka who had more or less been ignored by Sato.

[C] Now, Ganri Yamashita is called a fine fellow by Tanaka. But no one would follow him. Kakuei thinks Takeshita is the leader of the young generation who seeks a quick change of leadership, and sometimes talks ill behind his (Tanaka's) back---the rascal. Even so, he recognizes the strength of the Takeshita-Kanamaru group and thinks he has to keep them close at hand even while holding them in check.

[D] As for my view of the future, I think Shintaro Abe will certainly be the first among the present new leaders to assume political power.

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[Question] Why do you say that?

[D] One reason is Fukuda's age. No matter how much he persists, Fukuda has only 3 or 4 years left. He is in the fortunate position of having an old boss. Secondly, he has no rival in the Fukuda faction. Thirdly, he is neither a skillful speaker nor particularly sharp, but he stands above others---shall we call him an absentminded young man or young leader---and he has the personality to be a natural leader of others.

[A] Both Nakagawa and Takeshita are mini-Tanaka types. However, they are not, after all, men who can outstrip Kakuei Tanaka. Fortunately or unfortunately, because Abe belongs to a different type of politician, there is absolutely no way he can be compared to Tanaka. That is also to his credit.

[B] One more point. He doesn't give the image of being extremely sharp, but he has a sense of balance. As far as the Fukuda faction's course is concerned, it is hawkish and to the right and it would not be strange if he ran to the far right like Nakagawa. But within the Fukuda faction, he is a person who gives a sense of security that he won't fly away from the conservative main current.

Noboru Takeshita's Survival Path

[D] Contrary to other new leaders, he doesn't have to strain to bring in money.

[C] Yes, that's right. He doesn't have to make any effort at all. Kishi is looking after him.

[B] Compared to him, Rokusuke Tanaka is trying so hard.

[C] Frantically. (Laughter)

[A] Nakagawa is also working hard.

[B] That isn't so for Takeshita or Abe.

[C] Takeshita once tried hard, but now he has become very quiet. The road to a new life for Takeshita is to be forgotten by the public.

[C] It is better for him to disappear from the topic of new leaders.

[Question] How is the relationship between Takeshita and Nikaido? For example, in a situation where some accident happened to Tanaka, wouldn't the Nikaido faction and Takeshita faction split?

[C] No. No doubt, Nikaido would be the one turned to.

[B] However, that quiet strength of Nikaido has gradually come to shine. After Zenko, it will be Nikaido, and after Nikaido, Shintaro Abe.

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[A] If "dirty" Nikaido becomes prime minister, won't there be various troubles inside the LDP?

[C] "Dirty official" is a word used only by the mass media and the opposition parties. No one thinks Nikaido is a dirty official.

[Question] Didn't he get money from All Nippon Airlines?

[C] If he said he didn't get any money, then he didn't get any. (Laughter) But if receiving money is dirty, there aren't any politicians who are not dirty. (Laughter) Moreover, as for having received 5 million, if that is dirty, I don't think there are any politicians who are not dirty. Mr..X, if such is the case, then you are pitch black. (Laughter)

[Mr. X] No, I am told I'm deep red.

[B] As for Nikaido's personality, he is a simple, good man. I have that impression. A negative criticism of him is that he is wrapped up too much in Kakuei's shadow. Finally, whether there is a Nikaido government depends on how the public digests the problem of Kakuei.

[A] Therefore, conversely speaking, given a situation where Kakuei Tanaka has an accident and dies and a Nikaido government assumes power, or a situation where Nikaido takes over the government with Tanaka still alive, the public would have strong opposition to the latter.

[B] I think that there is also a case where there would be an atmosphere which allows Nikaido if Kakuei is not around. A Nikaido government would be easier if Kakuei is not around.

[C] Kakuei won't fall. He'll be around for another hundred years! (Laughter)

[A] But if Nikaido assumes power while Kakuei is around, won't there be quite a bit of confusion? For example, if Kakuei's trial judges him innocent and at the time Nikaido happens to be prime minister, it will seem that political power controls even the judicial power.

[C] Everything is being put in order before that.

[D] Everything will probably be put in order by the fall of next year.

Tokusaburo Kozaka's Limits

[C] Well, it is common sense to say it will be either Nakasone or Nikaido after Zenko, but depending on circumstances, there is Kawamoto, a dark horse. After him, it will be the era of Shintaro Abe, Noboru Takeshita, Rokusuke Tanaka, Ichiro Nakagawa and Michio Watanabe. Oh, I forgot---we have to add in Kiichi Miyazawa for the time being. Nikaido and Nakasone are of the same rank. If Kakuei says Nikaido, it will be Nikaido; if he says Nakasone, it will be Nakasone. If these two are not possible, then Kawamoto or Miyazawa will emerge.

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[A] I still think Tokusaburo Kozaka is possible.

[C] No. Kozaka's biggest minus point is that he doesn't have the experience of being on the bottom rung of the ladder. In his case, when he was a first and second year member, he did not acquire a sense of how to regulate by suffering with his companions on committees, suffering in the deliberations on the price of rice, nor in laying the groundwork here and there for electric rate increases. He came forth from the outset saying, "I'll be a new leader," and he is, so to speak, one of those who are recommended from above to the political world.

[D] He is in line with Aichiro Fujiyama, Naoto Ichimanda and Tatsunosuke Takasaki.

[B] In that sense, won't he follow the same fate as Shintaro Ishihara who failed?

[A] Kozaka cannot be called a candidate for prime minister if he is so afraid and intimidated by Hamako.

[C] Each has suffered being on the lowest rung of the ladder. Rokusuke Tanaka is now showily handling the position of MITI minister, but he has suffered miserably at the lowest rung in order to support the Ohira cabinet as vice chairman of the Diet Policy Committee when Abe was chairman. So each has his own suffering.

[B] The reason Miyazawa is not more attractive is that he became minister while quite young and so he has not experienced the bottom rung.

[C] Therefore, he has no sympathy from his companions. Takeshita, Abe, Rokusuke Tanaka, Nakagawa, Watanabe, they all have the mutual experience of the bottom rung. Therefore, a mutual feeling of fellowship exists.

[D] The reason Kozaka somehow isn't popular is because he came from the financial world, and has a mean spirit of not wanting to be a repetition of Aichiro Fujiyama. On the other hand, if he is in the mood or spirit to pour all that financial power into politics, saying it's fine if I am a repeat of Fujiyama, I think he would become more popular because that would be transmitted to others. I think there is no hope as long as he plays tennis, cruises on yachts and worries about having his fortune dwindle.

[B] As for someone in the New Liberal Club, the reason it is said that Toshio Yamaguchi, rather than Yohei Kono, has gradually won trust is probably because there is the feeling about him that he has suffered and scrubbed floors.

[C] If Tokusaburo Kozaka joined the Suzuki faction, a little more could be done. He joined the Tanaka faction even though he is older than Kakuei Tanaka; isn't that political suicide?

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[B] The limits of his political sense can be understood when one looks at the fact he joined the Tanaka faction.

Odds-on Favorite and Competitor in Prime Minister Race

[Question] If you were to buy a parimutuel ticket in the post-Suzuki prime minister race, who would be the odds-on favorite, the competitor and the dark horse?

[C] Nikaido and Nakasone, 4 and 4; Kawamoto and Miyazawa, 1 and 1.

[A] In terms of the significance of the post-Suzuki prime minister, it won't be Rokusuke Tanaka, Nakagawa or Abe.

[B] Isn't Fukuda also about 0.5?

[C] I don't think so.

[D] Aside from how long the Suzuki government will last, it will be Nakasone, 4; Nikaido, 3; and Kawamoto, 2. The reason Miyazawa is one is because there could not be a third generation prime minister from the Kochikai. But if he became prime minister, I give him a 1 because he would do well.

[Question] What about successive victories and double entries? For example, next would be Takeshita.

[C] Then it would be Nikaido and Abe.

[A] Nakasone and Takeshita.

[B] I think Nakasone and Abe.

[Question] What about Zenko Suzuki's reelection in November next year?

[A] I think that has the strongest possibility.

[D] I think so too.

[Question] If Suzuki should fall, what would be the hurdles besides health reasons?

[C] If the Tanaka faction leaves him.

[Question] Even if he gains no points politically, won't he continue as long as the Tanaka faction is with him?

[C] Right.

[A] Tanaka won't leave him. For Tanaka, he is the most convenient prime minister imaginable.

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[D] Now he is good for both the Tanaka faction and the Fukuda faction. There is a strange sense of security in that.

[C] There is another case. After Suzuki's reelection, Kakuei Tanaka would be prime minister.

[A] He finally appeared. (Laughter)

[B] That won't happen.

[C] If so, those who have been subjects of our discussions would all fly away.

[A] Kakuei himself is not considering such a thing.

[D] What about his real intention?

[C] Only Tanaka knows that. However, because he intends to be active for another 20 years or so, he would be a splendid post-Suzuki candidate. Right now he thinks of nothing but having the courts declare him innocent.

[D] Of course from his perspective, isn't his feeling one of how do I live the rest of my life if politics is taken away from me. Actually, it's quite distressing.

[B] Seeing him recently, I think he is getting more and more into a fascist predisposition. Let's do our utmost so that such a person doesn't become prime minister. (Laughter)

[A] If Suzuki continues another two years, how old will Kakuei be.

[B] 65. He's still young, isn't he?

Zenko Who Made Politics Boring

[C] If Tanaka is reinstated, all the present new leaders would fly away. Following him, it would be the era of the new "new leaders."

[A] Should Tanaka be made prime minister one more time, the impression of the new leaders would be that indeed they were negligent and extremely shabby.

[B] In such a case, what would the Nakagawa and Abe group do?

[D] Perhaps split the party.

[C] They aren't capable of such resolution.

[D] However, when they tried to form a reformed liberal party, they would have left if Fukuda had not said, "stop."

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[B] No, they couldn't leave.

[C] They can't leave. Japan is a country where Mitsuhide Akechi could not take over the whole country. One will take power in the end if one waits faithfully for his turn within the system. Therefore, Ieyasu Tokugawa took over the country. There is no one in 2,000 years of history who has seized political power from outside the system.

[D] What about Nobunaga Oda?

[C] He took advantage of Ashikaga as "shogun." At any rate, insurgents have all failed.

[B] It means that the season of uninteresting politics will continue a little while longer.

[C] One sees that when one reads newspaper articles on politics. There has perhaps been no time as uninteresting as now.

[D] Yesterday when I went to the Ginza, there was talk of nothing but Motoko Ito.

[A] Politics isn't a topic. When it was a question of whether Tanaka or Fukuda, arguments about the political situation were barbershop talk, but when it's a question of either Nakasone or Nakaido, it won't even become a topic of barbershop political talk.

[B] In the same way, whether it's Abe or Takeshita just won't become a topic.

[C] On that point, the stars have all disappeared. Since Suzuki, the expectations toward the prime minister have gradually lessened.

[A] Zenko made politics boring.

[D] It's too bad but everyone supported him.

[C] Nothing is more fundamentally uninteresting than politics supported by everyone.

[B] Since interesting politics lasted for eight years, we are now resting.

[D] We're tired. Tired from the 40 day dispute and the drama of dissolution. We were too active for a year.

[A] The dissolution put a stop to everything. It was thought that just couldn't be..



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[B] Won't everyone start to get bored and begin to grow restless again around the fall of next year?

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## POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

## CABINET RESHUFFLE FOCUS OF POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 2 Nov 81 p 1

[Text]

Activities in Japan's political world are quickly focusing on the expected cabinet reshuffle toward the end of this month, now that the government-proposed omnibus administrative and fiscal reform bill has been approved by the House of Representatives, informed sources said Sunday.

The controversial bill on which Suzuki said he would stake his political life has been the main business of the present extraordinary Diet session.

To be carried out simultaneously with the cabinet reshuffle will be a new lineup of three key executives of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP), whose president is Premier Suzuki himself.

Informed sources said there were nearly 100 LDP men who were qualified for the 20 cabinet posts, and they were already in a heated race for the posts.

Besides, faction leaders within the LDP are shaping up their strategy to win the LDP's presidential election which automatically promises the premier's post. The election is scheduled to be held in autumn 1982.

These developments gathered momentum on October 23 when former premiers Kakuei Tanaka and Takeo Fukuda, who had been on

bad terms for many years, met at a Japanese restaurant in Tokyo. This took place while Suzuki was out of the country to attend the North-South summit in Cancun, Mexico, and touched off a rumor that the Tanaka-Fukuda conference marked a thaw between the two factions led by them.

On October 29, International Trade and Industry Minister (MITI) Rokusuke Tanaka expressed his hope to remain in the cabinet during a meeting of his own faction on the ground that it would help him win political battles in the future.

The heated race for cabinet posts, party executive positions and the premiership is reflected in as many as 75 fund-raising parties scheduled from now through the end of the year for LDP men.

As far as the cabinet reshuffle is concerned, it is a "sellers' market," political observers said, giving almost a free hand to Premier Suzuki, but he must be very careful in selecting new cabinet members.

This arises from the fact that Suzuki's post is supported by a delicately balanced all-party setup which was realized following the unexpected death of former prime minister Masayoshi Ohira, which created a po-

litical vacuum within the ruling party.

One mistake by Suzuki in the cabinet reshuffle will endanger his post in the next LDP presidential election scheduled for next autumn, the sources said.

The most crucial points in the reshuffle involve the post of the party secretary-general, followed by the two other party executive posts; and whether or not Administrative Management Agency Director-General Yasuhiro Nakasone and Economic Planning Agency Director-General Toshio Komoto would remain within the cabinet, since both Nakasone and Komoto are leaders of the respective factions.

The three executive posts are to be held by the three mainstream faction led by Suzuki, Tanaka and Fukuda under an agreement already arrived at between these factions and most other members of the LDP.

But once the names of individual candidates for the posts are mentioned, there are bound to be conflicts despite the accord.

In fact, Fukuda has already indicated that the post of the secretary-general should go to factions other than that of Suzuki to avoid unfair rule of the party.

Under the circumstances,

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informed sources said, Suzuki is considering appointing Executive Board Chairman Susumu Nikaido to the post, but this is opposed by the Fukuda faction on the ground that Nikaido is Tanaka's closest aide.

Suzuki faction members also oppose Nikaido's appointment to the key post. They say that the coffers of the party would go under Nikaido's control, and moreover the next LDP presidential election would be run as Tanaka liked.

The 20 members of the Suzuki cabinet comprise three members each from the Suzuki, Tanaka and Fukuda factions, two each from the Nakasone and Komoto factions, one from the Nakagawa faction, three who are not affiliated with any faction and three members of the House of Councillors.

The Tanaka faction, which has swelled to 105 members, or the largest among the LDP factions, is crowded with candidates struggling to get a cabinet post.

The struggling is so intense that some Tanaka faction members have even called on the Suzuki faction to refrain as much as possible from trying to secure a cabinet post, "If Suzuki wants to be reelect-

ed LDP president through the next election."

The Tanaka faction has been driven into a tight corner after the former wife of Toshio Enomoto, former secretary of Tanaka, recently testified in the Tokyo District Court that her ex-husband had received a ¥500 million bribe from Lockheed Aircraft Corporation through Marubeni Corporation.

Nevertheless, it is not certain if the testimony will really hurt the faction in the forthcoming reshuffle of the key cabinet and party posts.

Some observers believe that Tanaka would do his utmost to increase his faction's influence both in the party and the cabinet in desperate efforts to maintain his prestige.

Indications also are that Suzuki is expected to retain both Nakasone and Komoto within his cabinet to avoid any unrest within the LDP.

Suzuki then wants to tour the Middle East and visit the US and China to strengthen his position before the LDP presidential election, the sources said.

On Sunday, Komoto was reported to have decided to remain within the Suzuki cabinet accepting Suzuki's request to this effect.

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## POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

## CABINET RESHUFFLE: WHO WILL BE FOREIGN MINISTER

Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 3 Oct 81 p 3

[Text]

The annual political game of musical chairs gets into full swing soon and there are four veteran conservative politicians already emerging as Japan's next possible foreign minister.

Prime Minister Suzuki is expected to reshuffle his Cabinet after the end of the current extraordinary session of the Diet in mid-November.

The firing and hiring of Cabinet ministers is overdue for Suzuki. His predecessors normally reshaped their Cabinet makeup every 12 months or so.

Suzuki became party president and prime minister in the summer of 1980 following the untimely death of Masayoshi Ohira.

Some ministers, notably heads of LDP factions, have been spared from the ax, but many men in the 20-member Cabinet barely have survived more than a year.

Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda, a World War II paratrooper officer who was brought to his present post after his predecessor resigned in protest in May in a dispute stemming from the interpretation of a joint Japan-U.S. communiqué, may survive, according to rumors floating in the political vineyard.

But others say Sonoda may face three foes—Shintaro Abe, chairman of the LDP Policy Board, Yoshio Sakurachi, LDP secretary-general and Masumi Esaki, a former min-

ister of international trade and industry.

Those who bet on Sonoda to stay on the job say he has been in his present post for only a few months. Sonoda bungled shortly after he replaced former Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito with a remark that a communiqué did not mean a nation's foreign policy.

Diplomacy is not Prime Minister Suzuki's forte, as he has specialized during most of his political career in behind-the-scenes give-and-take political wrangling or in fishery affairs.

Abe, regarded as a potential conservative party leader, has not served as foreign minister.

Sakurachi is reported to be interested in getting a Cabinet post. Foreign Ministry officials call him a top political figure rich in experience.

Bureaucrats apparently are more favorable to Sakurachi than Sonoda, who tends to display his strong personality. Under Sakurachi, foreign service officers believe they could reconstruct the nation's diplomacy guided by bureaucrats.

Esaki is said to be strongly interested in getting back to the "front stage," as he has been away from any Cabinet ministerial post for sometime.

He recently visited the Middle East and flew to Cairo following the assassination of

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.

A major hurdle for him is whether he wins a recommendation for a Cabinet portfolio from the faction led by former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka.

But in the final analysis, it's up to Prime Minister Suzuki to decide who he wants to have as his foreign minister.

He must make the decision taking the following into consideration: Emphasis on policy, award the foreign minister's post to person for his service to the ruling party, pick a man from the point of view of keeping factional balance or choose the foreign minister to check foreign service officers.

Sonoda and Esaki fit into the first category. They are generally believed able to tackle policy matters involving Japan's relations with the United States, South Korea, the Soviet Union and the Middle East.

Both Sakurachi and Abe could be ideal men for the job if Suzuki were to pick one in appreciation for his service to the party.

However, if Suzuki were to choose his foreign minister on the basis of factional power balance, he could not easily give it to any one because he would have to consider who gets other key cabinet posts, such as finance minister and MITI minister or three top party posts.

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## POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

## FUKUDA-TANAKA MEETING REVIEWED

Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 30 Oct 81 p 3

[Article by Raisuke Honda in "Political Beat" column]

[Text]

The unannounced and unexpected meeting of former prime ministers Kakuei Tanaka and Takeo Fukuda astonished the political world, although there are good reasons on both sides to repair their ruptured relations.

The Tanaka-Fukuda talks were really a surprise. The two have had very chilly relations and have never met since Tanaka resigned as premier under fire for his "money-power politics" in 1974, although the Tanaka and Fukuda factions now serve as two separate mainstays of the Suzuki government.

A little more than dozen years ago, Tanaka and Fukuda used to be called the two main pillars of the administration of the late Eisaku Sato.

Tanaka did much for the long life of the Sato cabinet through his services in raising political funds for the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) and handling other party affairs.

Fukuda, for his part, played an important role in helping formulate and implement key policies of the Sato government.

At the end of the Sato cabinet in 1972, however, Tanaka acted contrary to the wishes of the late Sato who wanted Fukuda to become his successor.

When Tanaka ran in the 1972 presidential election for LDP president and defeated Fukuda, they had a bitter falling out.

Why, then, did the two hold these personal talks after so many years of enmity?

It is believed that a senior member of the Fukuda faction, Mitsuo Setoyama, acted as "go-between" for the Tanaka-Fukuda reconciliation talks.

According to LDP sources, Setoyama arranged the talks between Tanaka and Fukuda over lunch at a Japanese restaurant near the Diet building last Friday with former Defense Agency director-general Tokutaro Kimura as host.

Setoyama, who is said eager to get either of the three executive posts of the LDP in the forthcoming reshuffle of the cabinet and party lineup, reportedly had

asked Kimura to invite Tanaka and Fukuda to the luncheon. The two attended a party held last summer in honor of Kimura.

Apparently with a view to playing down the significance of his talks with Tanaka, Fukuda was quoted by his aides as saying: "I accepted Kimura's invitation only because he told me that there would many attending the luncheon, including Mr Tanaka. I was really surprised only four came to the meeting, but nothing important was discussed in my talks with Mr Tanaka."

Meanwhile, Tanaka is quoted as saying he had never been told in advance that Fukuda would come to the luncheon.

However, there has been strong political attention paid to the Tanaka-Fukuda meeting because it came only a month before the reshuffle of the cabinet and party lineup scheduled for late November.

As LDP Dietman well informed of the party's interfactional relations says: "The meeting was certainly a great boon to Tanaka. To Tanaka, who is working all-out to be reinstated in the political world despite his current status as defendant in the Lockheed payoff trial, the talks with Fukuda, the strongest critic against Tanaka's 'money-power politics,' is certainly a big step forward toward that goal."

"You wonder why Fukuda agreed to have talks with Tanaka," he continued, "but Fukuda seems to have not yet given up the idea of taking the reins of government again."

"If so, it is only natural for Fukuda to want to meet Tanaka to end their awkward relations," the Dietman speculated.

Prime Minister Suzuki was reportedly informed of the Tanaka-Fukuda talks while in Cancun, Mexico, for the summit conference of rich and poor countries.

Suzuki reportedly kept his composure when hearing the news, saying only, "That is not of any significance."

However, he may very well be feeling very uneasy that the two main supporters of his government went into a huddle when he was out of Japan.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

SUZUKI'S PLANS RIPENING FOR PERSONNEL RESHUFFLE

Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 11 Nov 81 p 2

[Article by Takehiko Takahashi]

[Text]

The Extraordinary Diet session now under way is scheduled to continue to Nov. 17. An extension may be inevitable. LDP Secretary General Yoshio Sakurauchi has stated that he would like to see the Diet work concluded by Nov. 26. Since the term of office of the LDP officers will terminate on Nov. 27, what Sakurauchi means is that he would like to have the Diet session ended by then.

Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki has been thinking from some time in the past of carrying out a cabinet reshuffle together with a change of party officers. But because of Justice Minister Seisuke Okuno's statement concerning the testimony by Enomoto's divorced wife, the Diet may be extended longer than earlier anticipated. Voices have been heard within the LDP that it might be difficult to bring the Diet session to an end by Nov. 26.

The late Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda liked to carry out a cabinet reshuffle on the "8" days of the month, that is, on the 8th, 18th and 28th. It is believed that this was because the Japanese ideograph for "8" can be seen to "open up toward

the end" and Ikeda seemed to consider this a lucky omen.

There is a custom in Japan for certain days to be considered "lucky" and some other days to be considered "unlucky." For a wedding, a day called "Taian" is selected—never a day called "Butsumetsu." Similarly the day of "Tomobiki" is avoided for a funeral.

In the light of this superstition, it is thought that Prime Minister Suzuki is likely to carry out a reshuffle of the cabinet and party posts on Dec. 2 after the Diet session ends. This is because Dec. 2, a Wednesday, is also the day of "Taian."

Rumors Abound

Many rumors are already circulating as to the reshuffle of cabinet and party posts. Let us consider some of the possibilities.

LDP secretary general—Considered as the most likely candidate is Susumu Nikaido (Tanaka faction), present chairman of the LDP Executive Council. Because of suspected involvement in the Lockheed scandal, Nikaido was labeled

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as a "gray high-ranking official." For a while he did not appear on the front stage of the political world.

By becoming chairman of the LDP Executive Council, the dishonor of being called a "gray high-ranking official" was removed. For that reason, even Shintaro Abe (Fukuda faction), chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council, is saying that he would not object to "Nikaïdo becoming the party's secretary general."

Nikaïdo heads the Tanaka faction. The testimony this time by Enomoto's divorced wife has strengthened the speculation that former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka will be found guilty. There is therefore an opinion that Prime Minister Suzuki might avoid appointing Nikaïdo as secretary general. Nevertheless, former Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda is strongly opposed to having the next secretary general come from the Suzuki faction. In the final analysis, there may be no alternative except to make a choice from the numerically largest Tanaka faction.

There is a view that in such a case, Prime Minister Suzuki will select Shin Kanemaru, who is at present chairman of the special committee on administrative reform, as the secretary general rather than

Nikaïdo.

If so, according to some opinions, a dissolution effect might gradually appear within the Tanaka faction and this is what Prime Minister Suzuki is secretly hoping for.

Should the secretary general's post be filled by someone from the Tanaka faction, the remaining two key officers—chairman of the Executive Council and chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council—will probably be from the Fukuda and Suzuki factions.

Likely prospects from the Fukuda faction as chairman of the Executive Council are Education Minister Tatsuo Tanaka and former Justice Minister Mitsuo Setoyama. It was Setoyama who earlier arranged a meeting between former Prime Ministers Fukuda and Tanaka and some say that this was a sales pitch aiming at becoming chairman of the Executive Council.

Although the name of Chief Cabinet Secretary Kiichi Miyazawa is mentioned as the most likely prospect as chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council, it is problematical whether Prime Minister Suzuki will release Miyazawa who is well-versed in diplomacy. On the other hand, if

Miyazawa is retained as chief cabinet secretary, MITI Minister Rokusuke Tanaka, who has a strong feeling of rivalry with Miyazawa, will strongly oppose being transferred elsewhere. There is the danger of the Suzuki faction being plunged into confusion.

Drawing the greatest attention among the cabinet members is Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda. Chairman Shintaro Abe of the Policy Affairs Research Council is certain to enter the cabinet, and it is considered most likely that he will be given the foreign minister's post.

Abe, however, does not favor being regarded as "a candidate for foreign minister." Abe became chief cabinet secretary after Sonoda in the Fukuda cabinet. If he again assumes a post in succession to Sonoda, Abe will constantly be in the position of "driving out Sonoda." Abe seems to be concerned about this.

Prime Minister Suzuki has not given any definite hints as yet regarding the personnel reshuffle. Nevertheless, rumors centering around the personnel reshuffle and sales pitches are taking place briskly within the Liberal-Democratic Party.

(The writer is an adviser to the Mainichi Newspapers and former chief editorial writer).

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

SONODA FACES DIFFICULTY IN RETAINING POST

Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 12 Nov 81 p 2

[Article by Minoru Shimizu]

[Text]

One of the focal points in the reshuffle of Cabinet ministers and top party executives which Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki is expected to carry out at the end of this month, or early next month at the latest, is whether or not Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda will be retained in his present post.

Sonoda, then health and welfare minister, was appointed foreign minister last May to replace Masayoshi Ito who resigned to take responsibility for the confusion concerning the interpretation of the joint communique of the Japan-U.S. summit.

During the six months he has been foreign minister, Sonoda has lived up to his reputation as a man of action. In this short period he has held as many as seven meetings with U.S. Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig and has also had talks with Soviet government leaders in an effort to bring about some improvement in Japan-Soviet relations.

His style of diplomacy contrasts strongly with that of former Foreign Minister Ito which was always low-keyed and cautious.

Dual Diplomacy

At the same time, Sonoda has eliminated the discord concerning foreign affairs between the "Kantel" (prime minister's official residence) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which had been a serious problem at the time when Ito was foreign minister. One reason for this discord was that Ito did not get along with Chief Cabinet Secretary Kiichi Miyazawa, despite the fact that they were both leading members of the same (Suzuki) faction. This frequently resulted in a lack of coordination in the handling of foreign affairs between Ito at the Foreign Ministry and Miyazawa, who had his office at the prime minister's official residence. For this reason the diplomacy of the Suzuki Cabinet was criticized as being a "dual diplomacy" conducted by the Kantel and the Foreign Ministry.

In Sonoda's favor, therefore, it can be said that he has fulfilled his role as a replacement for former Foreign Minister Ito and has rescued Prime Minister Suzuki from the predicament in which he found himself at the time of the joint communique hassle.

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On the other hand, however, he has brought upon himself a great deal of criticism by making a number of ill-considered statements arising from his natural outspokenness. (A prediction that this might be the case was made in this column of June 11.) Many members of the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) and Foreign Ministry veterans give him a low rating for his achievements as foreign minister and are strongly critical of his diplomatic stance.

This criticism of Sonoda's diplomacy made itself apparent recently at a joint meeting of six foreign affairs study committees of the LDP. This meeting was held to hear Sonoda report on the North-South summit at Cancun, Mexico, and other diplomatic matters. However, there were no questions raised concerning Sonoda's report — instead a series of criticisms were leveled against Sonoda for several "slips of the tongue" he had made in the recent past. Several right-wing LDP Dietmen, including Tokuchiro Tamazawa, Eiichi Nakao and Akira Hatano, grilled the foreign minister on his "diplomatic ideology."

Some samples of their questions and criticisms were:

— Why had Sonoda made statements harmful to relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea?

— Sonoda's perception of diplomatic problems concerning the U.S. is too optimistic.

— In his efforts to promote diplomacy with the Soviet Union, he should take care not to aid and abet the Soviet strategy of alienating Japan from the U.S.

Sonoda was a member of the Democratic Party when the first Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was approved by the Diet in 1951 (the party in power at the time being the Liberal Party), and Tamazawa went so far as to attack Sonoda for having opposed the treaty at that time.

#### Slip of Tongue

Sonoda's most serious slip of the tongue was his statement in Manila, one month after he became foreign minister, that "joint communiques are not binding." He was said to have made this statement to help out Prime Minister Suzuki who was in a difficult position over the interpretation of the Japan-U.S. joint communique. Refuting as it did the validity of a joint communique drawn up on the basis of an agreement between the leaders of two nations, this statement undermined other countries' confidence in Japan, and in the U.S. It aroused a particularly strong feeling of distrust.

This setback in relations with the U.S. which form the pivot of Japan's diplomacy has done much harm to Sonoda's position. His critics in the LDP cite this indiscretion as the main ground for their criticism.

Following are some examples of other notable Sonoda gaffes:

— Concerning U.S. diplomacy in the United Nations: "Without paying what it should (U.N. contributions), the U.S. has no right to rule the roost."

— Regarding former U.S. Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer's statement on the nuclear weapons question: "It is uncalled-for, big-power meddling — extremely bad form."

— Concerning the \$6 billion loan requested by Korea: "A figure dreamed up overnight."

At the foreign affairs meeting, Foreign Minister Sonoda gave explanations in answer to a large number of questions and at the same time made repeated promises that he would take good care not to let his tongue run away with him in the future.

#### Sonoda's Calculation

Observers regard Sonoda's statements as being calculated. They say it is Sonoda's method to "shoot up fireworks" and decide his policy while watching the reaction.

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Some members of the LDP are also of the opinion that they are part of Sonoda's diplomatic strategy. They say he consciously aims at getting publicity in the mass media and creating his own "originality" after taking into consideration the reaction to his statements.

Recently, however, many members of the government and LDP have been voicing the opinion that Sonoda's diplomacy lacks consistency, holding him responsible in particular for upsetting Japan's relations with the U.S. Even a leader of the Tanaka faction who is well disposed toward Sonoda has said that, in view of the vehemence of the criticism leveled against him at the joint meeting on foreign affairs, there is no chance of Sonoda being retained.

However, Sonoda enjoys the special confidence of Prime Minister Suzuki and is therefore hopeful that the prime minister will continue to treat him favorably. At the time of the intraparty dispute aimed at forcing the withdrawal of Prime Minister Takeo Miki in 1976, Sonoda and Suzuki fought side by side in alliance with Susumu Nakano, now chairman of the LDP's Executive Council. They won the day, and the Miki Cabinet was forced to resign at the end of that year. Since that time Suzuki and Sonoda have been very close.

**Suzuki's Passive Attitude**

But observers say that in view of the fact that Suzuki is now taking a passive attitude toward a proposed tour of the Middle East next January, the prime minister appears to be having second thoughts about

retaining Sonoda.

It was Sonoda who proposed that the prime minister should visit the Middle East at an early date, and in this he was motivated by his desire to remain in the post of foreign minister. If the prime minister is to make a tour of the Middle East in January, preparations will have to be started immediately. And to change foreign ministers once these preparations have begun would be undesirable from the standpoint of "diplomatic continuity." In this way Sonoda hoped to virtually guarantee his retention as foreign minister by having the prime minister decide to make a Middle East tour at an early date.

From the viewpoint of Japan's relations with other countries, two changes of foreign ministers within the space of one year would be undesirable. Sonoda has been in the post for only a little more than half a year, and in this sense it would be proper to retain him. (He had formerly served a two-year term as foreign minister). However, it cannot be denied that his statements over the past six months have raised many doubts as to his suitability.

In the LDP, two names have already been put forward as candidates for the foreign minister's post. They are Shintaro Abe, chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council, who is an executive of the Fukuda faction and one of the so-called new leaders, and Yoshio Sakurachi, the party's secretary-general.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

SETBACK IN JAPAN-SOVIET TIES

Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 1 Nov 81 p 2

["Behind the Scenes" column by Minoru Hirano]

[Text]

The cancellation of the visit to Japan by Soviet Education Minister Mikhail A. Prokofyev chilled the mood for mending the Japan-Soviet fence which had been building up since the talks between Foreign Minister Sonoda and his Soviet counterpart Andrei Gromyko in September. The cancellation reminded the Japanese, once again, the difficulty of Japan-Soviet relations.

The reason for the cancellation was procedural. The Foreign Ministry decided to issue a specific visa instead of a diplomatic visa on the grounds that Prokofyev had been invited by the Parliamentarians League for Japan-Soviet Friendship and his coming would be part of the Japan-Soviet exchanges of parliamentarians. There are precedents where the Foreign Ministry issued a specific visa for Soviet ministers except Foreign Minister Gromyko.

But this is only one side of the story. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Japanese Government froze high-level official exchanges of personnel with the Soviet Union as part of its sanctions against that country. Inasmuch as the Soviet troops still occupy Afghanistan, the Japanese Government cannot totally lift the sanctions. If the government issues a diplomatic visa for Prokofyev, talks between him and members of the Japanese cabinet will have to be arranged, and then this will be taken as easing of the sanctions.

The Soviet Union probably intended to find a way to make Japan lift its sanctions against the Soviets. The Soviet Union says that Sonoda and Gromyko agreed to promote Japan-Soviet government-level contacts. The Soviet Government issued diplo-

matic visas when Japanese Diet members including former foreign minister Ichiro Hatoyama visited Moscow. The Soviet Union claims that whatever the precedent may be, the Japanese Government insulted the Soviet Union by not treating Prokofyev as a member of the cabinet, and violated the agreement reached between Gromyko and Sonoda and the principle of reciprocity. By cancelling the visit by the education minister, Moscow expressed its protest against Japan.

Press comments on this incident are divided into two tones. One group of newspapers says that the Soviet Union attempted to rock Japan by taking advantage of its zeal to start a dialog with that country and that the Japanese Government should take a resolute stand against it. The other group says that enhanced dialog between the two countries is necessary for both sides and the incident was an unhappy one for both countries. This latter group says that if the Soviet education minister arrived in Japan with a specific visa, the Soviet Union would have been able to pave the way for high-level exchanges on the basis of that and that Japan, too, should beware of the US and West Europe's positive contacts with Moscow.

The situation is complicated by the hostile attitude of many Liberal-Democrats and the unfavorable attitude of Foreign Ministry officials toward Sonoda, who is considered an advocate of promotion of friendship with the Soviet Union. Sonoda went on record saying that the goal of Japanese diplomacy is to prevent the US and the Soviet Union from going to war. At the time of the UN General Assembly, he met Gromyko and US Secretary of State

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Alexander Haig separately, and after returning to Tokyo, he claimed he had served as a mediator between the two superpowers.

Administrative Management Agency Director-General Yasuhiro Nakasone criticized Sonoda's foreign policy when he said, at a meeting of the Liberal-Democratic members of the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly on October 24, that Japan, which depends on the US for its national security, could not hope to serve as a mediator between the US and the Soviet Union.

Sonoda and Nakasone have always been on bad terms. Sonoda was grilled by his foes in the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) at a joint session of five LDP committees on foreign, security and other affairs Thursday for his slip of tongue on Japan's foreign relations.

To Sonoda, who is under a crossfire of censures, the Foreign Ministry is cold. Mainstream officials of the Foreign Ministry attach top importance to Japan-US relations, and are worried about Sonoda's policy. There is a strong mood among them to consider Sonoda an "invader" because Sonoda assumed the post of foreign minister succeeding Masayoshi Ito, who resigned by assuming responsibility for the Japan-US joint statement.

Will Sonoda be able to remain in the cabinet as foreign minister overcoming such a bitter mood against him? It depends on Prime Minister Suzuki's judgment alone. The future of Japan-Soviet relations hinges on whether Sonoda remains in the post or not.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

SOCIALIST PARTY CONVENTION PREPARATIONS UNDERWAY

Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 4 Nov 81 p 7

[Editorial: "JSP Convention"]

[Text]

The Japan Socialist Party has started preparing for its national convention in February 1982. It has drawn up a draft for the revision of "The Road to Socialism in Japan," which has hitherto been a party platform in all but name. This draft, which was drawn up after lengthy debate, will be submitted to the convention. There are also moves to hold an election of the party chairman, in which all the party members will participate, prior to the convention.

The draft for the revision of "The Road to Socialism" takes an unprecedentedly realistic view of the domestic and international scenes, and is clearly designed to establish a new course for the 1980s, a course that is far more realistic than the one established 15 years ago by "The Road to Socialism." Let us look at the changes in the party's appraisal of the existing situation and at the steps it intends to take to cope with this situation.

For instance, it recognizes the trends toward the multi-polarization and diversification of international relations and shows signs of trying to escape from the simple formula of East-West confrontation. It also states that problems with regard to democracy are common to the socialist countries and that this springs from political immaturity. In the drive to reform the existing situation, the party, according to the draft, will not restrict itself to opposing the Government's policies, but will encourage the foundation of a democratic socialist state by means of greater participation in popular movements.

But in the process of arriving at this draft, there remain suspicions about just how much debate there was concerning the implications of developments in Afghanistan and Poland. In addition, despite the fact that the intellectuals who prepared the draft had taken as broad a point of view as possible, it seems that, when the draft was presented for discussion by the party, the rightists and leftists merely bickered over it in terms of their own narrow views.

In this debate, the main theme, which concerned the socialist vision of the future, was carried over as a study theme until the end of 1982. Henceforth, debate should not be confined to the party; it is important that the interest of the general public should be aroused.

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This debate will be greatly affected by the JSP's system of leadership, and the ability of its leaders. Since these factors are connected with the course the party takes, it is only natural that there should be interest both inside and outside the party concerning who will lead the party.

Recently, there have been a series of problems that have exposed the weakness of Asukata's leadership. In addition to the waverings with respect to the "administrative reform Diet" and the split in the JSP's Tokyo Chapter, there is the lack of consistency concerning the action policy for the Upper House national constituency election in 1983. The party leaders first decided on a policy of dividing the constituency by region so that candidates would get votes principally from the regions to which they are assigned. In the face of strong opposition from the labor unions, however, it seems that the leaders are now inclined to retain to some extent the present formula, by which candidates get votes from labor unions.

The rightist factions within the party, which are dissatisfied with the present confused situation, are thinking of setting up a candidate to oppose Asukata. But observers within the party, and particularly the leftist factions that intend to continue supporting Asukata, believe that these moves are aimed eventually at winning the post of secretary-general for the right, and not the chairmanship. If this is true, the factional politicking that has been endemic in the party has clearly not been laid to rest.

Perhaps the selection of party leaders by means of compromises reached between factions cannot be helped. But there is no serious debate in the JSP concerning what system of leadership is needed so that the long decline in the party's strength can be arrested. It is only these factional transactions that are noticeable.

The party should take a look at the changes in the environment surrounding the party. In view of the labor federations' moves to form a unified front, the election of the JSP leaders will have greater significance than ever.

An election in which factional considerations are allowed too much play will create grudges and will further reduce the energy of the party. The party should consider a run-off vote in an election in which all the party members participate. This would be appreciated by the general public. (Nov. 2)

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MILITARY

JAPAN, SUPERPOWER STRATEGY ANALYZED

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[11-Part article by Ryochi Nishijima, Akira Saito, Tatou Takahama, Kozo Kumura, Koichi Hamazaki and Yasuo Suzuki: "Japan and Superpower Strategy"]

[19 Oct 81 p 1]

[Text] ASDF Must Destroy 30 Percent of Invading Enemy Aircraft

There has been a great upheaval in the world, centering on the Middle East, and President Reagan apparently wants to cope with the situation with a display of force. This has brought about a certain amount of acrimony from the Soviet Union and other European nations.

Japan, too, has been pressured to increase its defense capability and this has presented the country with a number of difficult problems.

This is the first of a series in which The Yomiuri Shimbun will review Japan's defense problems as objectively as possible.—Editor.

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The metallic, ear-splitting roar of jet fighter planes rent the air at the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) base at Chitose, Hokkaido, in the early morning of October 8.

An order came down from the Northern Air Defense Headquarters in Misawa, Aomori-ken, which commands the Second Wing stationed at Chitose Air Base:

"More than 40 planes of an unidentified nationality are approaching Wakkanai and Tobetsu radar sites.

They are in two-plane formations. Take off immediately and intercept."

Squadrons of fighters, already on standby in the air over the base, flew north, followed immediately by F4EJs and F104Js on standby on the ground.

An defense mobilization order had only been issued in the afternoon of the previous day and the ASDF was not fully prepared for action.

Soon the invading planes were reported to have attacked 10 radar sites in Hokkaido and the Tohoku district in northern Honshu, and then ground-to-air missile bases near the Chitose and Misawa air bases.

Another report said that about three of the ASDF interceptors had been damaged and the number of damaged planes was increasing.

Thirty minutes later, a second wave of invading planes—about the same number as before—arrived, meaning that the invading forces had completely succeeded in mounting a surprise attack.

These were the assumptions on which the ASDF carried out a one-week comprehensive exercise beginning October 3.

A total of 550 planes plus 48,000 members of the ASDF were mobilized in the exercise which was conducted also on the assumption that the US could not help Japan because it needed its planes for operations in other areas.

Japan's air space is guarded by 28 radar stations across the country, which are linked to seven ASDF air bases, six Nike and eight Hawk ground-to-air missile units. There are a total of about 300 interceptors at the seven air bases.

In the front line, guarding northern Japan, is the Second Wing stationed at Chitose Air Base with 40 jet fighters, comprising F104Js and F4Es.

"A fighter-bomber stationed at a base in Siberia's Maritime Province would take only about 20 minutes to cross the Japan Sea and this puts us under a great strain, said Maj Gen Tadayoshi Yonekawa, commander of the wing.

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Lt-Col Kyoji Sugishita, 44, commander of the 302nd Squadron of F4EJs, and Lt Col Shingo Shirai, 41, commander of the 203rd Squadron of F104Js, both stressed, "We can't afford to be defeated."

The air base was built 25 years ago and planes stationed there scrambled for the 2,000th time last July 9. It appeared that the pilots at the air base were haunted by thoughts of Soviet planes because all the scrambles have been caused by Soviet aircraft.

"There are very few cases of single-seated fighter planes flying over the Japan Sea," said Yonekawa.

He said Soviet planes flying over the Japan Sea are electronic reconnaissance planes such as TU16s and TU95s as well as IL38s designed to collect information. They make an average 220 flights a year around Japan, he added.

The Soviet Union maintains 2,210 aircraft in the Far East region and this

leaves open the question of how Japan can effectively counter them.

"The main question is—how many Soviet planes carrying bombs are capable of flying to Japan?" staff officers remarked.

"A maximum of 800 of these planes would probably have this capability and 400 of them would be deployed in a limited invasion," they said.

"In order to thwart their plans," the staff officers said, "we have to inflict as much damage as possible on the invading planes at the very outset of the conflict."

"We must shoot down at least 30 percent of the Soviet planes in the first and second waves of an invasion to make the Soviets abandon their invasion plans."

"Japan alone is incapable of destroying all Soviet military aircraft stationed in the Far East."

What we earnestly hope is to cut off a limb from the Soviet Air Force in the Far East. To enable us to fight the Soviets on an equal footing, the government must rebuild Japan's defense capability within the framework of the Japan-US security setup."

The exercise was apparently designed to determine how long the ASDF would be able to maintain its force in order to shoot down 30 percent of all invading aircraft.

It was carried out on the assumption that a surprise attack was mounted after the US Air Force had withdrawn all its aircraft from Japan to fight in for operations elsewhere.

If the hypothetical war was prolonged, the ASDF would suffer from a lack of staying power since it has only 300 interceptors at its disposal.

Nevertheless, the recent change in the international situation apparently compelled the ASDF to carry out the exercise.

[20 Oct 81 p 1]

[Text] U.S. Expects Japan To Play Significant Role in War

The weather was glorious with the mercury hovering around 30 degrees centigrade. It was still summer in Okinawa and Japan's southwestern sea-lane was as congested as the main Ginza Street in Tokyo.

At 10.30 am, the O-owashi, a P2J antisubmarine reconnaissance plane of the Fifth Air Wing of the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) left Naha Airport heading southwest.

Maintaining an altitude of only 300 meters and cruising at 250 kilometers per hour, the plane was searching for submarines along the sea-lane that stretches from Japan's main islands

toward the Philippines via Okinawa.

Almost every minute, the plane's captain, Lt. Cmdr Hiroaki Sajiki, would make announcements to the aircraft's 11 other crew members such as "Freighter, about 3,000 meters, to starboard ahead" or "Two freighters on the port side."

Looking down at the sea from the spotter's seat in the fore section of the plane, the water was crowded with a large number of Japanese freighters, tankers and fishing boats. The Shiqian, a 2,400-ton Chinese survey ship, was also roaming around.

"Of course, it will not be an easy task to protect all

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of them from enemy submarines in case of war," said Petty Officer 2nd Class Hitoshi Haraguchi who was in charge of weapons.

Surveillance and identification of the ships below were not the principal tasks of the aircraft. Its main mission was antisubmarine warfare in which it had to locate, chase and destroy submarines with torpedoes.

On its return flight from Miyako Island, a flying distance of 70 minutes from Okinawa, it was announced: "An enemy sub is passing through the area below."

This heralded the start of a simulated antisubmarine warfare exercise.

The plane dropped smoke candles to demarcate the area where the enemy submarine was supposed to be cruising.

Then sonobuoys, which are used to detect underwater sounds and transmit them by radio, were launched since the radar system aboard the reconnaissance plane was incapable of detecting the presence of a submerged submarine.

Crewmen aboard the plane tried to deduce from the data provided by the sonobuoys and recorded by a computer the direction, speed and depth of the submarine. This was needed before homing torpedoes could be launched.

The simulated exercise ended with the captain declaring that the enemy submarine had been destroyed.

The water below the reconnaissance plane appeared peaceful but it was near this sea-lane that the Japanese freighter Nisshio Maru was sunk on April 9 by the US Polaris-type submarine George Washington. The George Washington was loaded with sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) at the time.

In another incident, fire gutted a Soviet submarine near Okinawa in August last year.

The George Washington was being remodeled into an attack submarine at Pearl Harbor when this correspondent visited the submarine base of the US Forces Pacific.

Capt William Smith, the base commander, said that all Polaris missiles had been unloaded from the submarine for the remodeling.

Other submarines at the base were two Los Angeles-type nuclear-powered subs, including the Omaha, and the Patrick Henry, which carries Poseidon missiles.

Recently the Soviet Union deployed long-range, SLBM-mounted nuclear submarines in areas covering on the Sea of Okhotsk and has launched the missile-carry-

ing, Typhoon-type nuclear submarine. These actions have greatly enhanced Soviet naval power.

The Soviet Union has also perfected Alpha-type, nuclear-powered attack submarines designed to locate and destroy US submarines.

Under the circumstances, the US is being forced to step up its efforts to strengthen its submarine deterrent capability.

In the case of Japan, the P2J antisubmarine reconnaissance planes are scheduled to be replaced from December by the more efficient P3C Orions.

The P2Js of the MSDF have participated regularly in special joint Japan-US exercises off Kauai, one of the Hawaiian Islands, with the aim of training the crewmen of the planes in the use of homing torpedoes.

The exercises symbolize the fact that the US expects Japan to play a greater role in any conflict against the Soviet Union's underwater forces since there is a high concentration of Soviet submarines in the seas around Japan.

It is therefore apparent that Japan's defense of the sea-lanes is not only to protect Japanese ships but also to play a significant role in any global nuclear warfare involving the US.

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[22 Oct 81 p 1]

[Text] 'Chobetsu' Checks All Communications for Military Data

"Attention: Surface-to-air missile spotted at 4 o'clock, aimed at this plane."

The US Defense Department announced at 7 pm on August 26 (8 am August 27 Japan Time) that a missile had been fired at a US Air Force SR7 strategic reconnaissance plane while it was flying near the Korean Peninsula. The plane was not hit and returned safely to base.

"Our information gathering system is capable of picking up these developments," Defense Agency officials said without elaboration.

The system referred to is a unit of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) called "Chobetsu," an abbreviation for "Chosa-Besshitsu."

Chosa-Besshitsu (literally a branch for intelligence) belongs to the 2nd Intelligence Section of the Intelligence Department of the Ground Staff Office.

Chobetsu has two missions. One is to assess the military situation in neighboring countries by analyzing radio messages monitored in Japan and the other is to intercept and analyze the radio communications of aircraft, warships and other vessels as well as microwave transmissions to determine what military activities are underway in these countries.

The Chobetsu section maintains monitoring stations at Higashi-Chitose (Hokkaido), Kofunato (Niigata-ken), Ohi (Saitama-

ken), Miho (Tottori-ken), Tachiarai (Fukuoka-ken) and on Kikagashima island in the Amami Islands. The Higashi-Chitose station maintains branch stations in Wakkanai and Nemuro, both in Hokkaido.

Some of these stations are responsible for monitoring the Soviet Union while the rest focus on China, North Korea or other countries.

Chobetsu, which is based at GSDF's regional headquarters in Ichigaya, Tokyo, has a workforce of 1,100. Seventy percent of these personnel are assigned to regional stations or branches, which operate on a round-the-clock basis.

The intelligence personnel either monitor transmissions with earphones or scan radar screens. They are extremely proficient in foreign languages.

All information collected at these stations is sent to the headquarters at Ichigaya and thoroughly analyzed.

For instance, the Miho station, located near Miho Air Base of the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), is used exclusively for areas covering the Korean Peninsula.

The station features a circular antenna with a total of 36 steel towers, each 36 meters tall, forming a circle 150 meters in diameter.

Nicknamed a "cage for elephants," it has been in use since 1979. Employing the most advanced electronic apparatus and techniques, the station is reportedly capable of collecting all information transmitted by radio.

A similar facility is maintained at Higashi-Chitose to monitor Soviet radio com-

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munications.

A great deal of classified information passes through the Defense Agency's hands but Chobetsu's operations are considered top secret. Outsiders are strictly prohibited from entering Chobetsu's regional or branch stations and not a single piece of information gathered by the unit is disclosed to unauthorized persons.

It might even be a violation of regulations even to mention that Chobetsu is engaged in gathering various kinds of information.

However, it was Chobetsu that most accurately predicted the start of fighting on the Sino-Vietnamese border on February 17, 1979.

Chobetsu knew most of the "call numbers" of Chinese Air Force units and it realized that, beginning in January 1979, these call numbers were being used more often in southern China near the Vietnam border.

It was alerted by the fact that 700 Chinese planes, including MiG17s, MiG19s and the air force's treasured F9s, were in the area. Air force units had also been moved from the Sino-Soviet border area.

Based on this information Chobetsu concluded that China had resolved to start a war with Vietnam. Ten days later, China delivered what it called a military "lesson" against Vietnam.

This was one of Chobetsu's major achievements and reportedly surprised the US.

The method employed in monitoring the Sino-Vietnamese dispute is also applied to the Soviet Union and North Korea.

The call number of Soviet troops stationed in the Far East, areas where they are deployed, exercises and communications are closely monitored day and night.

Unusual developments or suspension of these communications are always closely examined to determine whether or not an emergency has arisen.

Nonmilitary communications, such as on railway services and the daily life of the people, are also considered important since they might indicate changes in the military situation.

ASDF planes also collect information with the use of radar.

Changes in freight shipments between the Soviet Union and Vietnam and between the Soviet Union and North Korea are monitored through "observations" by Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) ships.

A former Defense Agency director-general said the information being collected could not be more complete or accurate and a military satellite would have to be employed to improve on it.

However, if the information collected by Chobetsu and other defense force units is not compared with diplomatic and political information gathered by other agencies it might wind up as a wasted effort.

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[23 Oct 81 p 1]

[Text] Washington Mesmerized by 'Threat' From Soviet Union

The Council on Foreign Relations, which is housed in an old three-story building on 68th Street in New York, came into existence 60 years ago and prides itself on being one of the most authoritative organs on foreign affairs in the US.

However, the so-called "Soviet threat" has greatly influenced the council's way of thinking.

A typical example of this influence was the compilation of a booklet entitled "The Soviet Challenge" that was issued by the council last May.

Compiled after the subject matter had been thoroughly discussed by the council's 14 members, including former State Department adviser Helmut Sonnenfeldt, the booklet covers the "Soviet threat" theory as if it were in line with public opinion.

One of the most interesting facts about the booklet, however, is that three "doves" left the council just before it appeared. They were George Kennan, former ambassador to the Soviet Union, Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware and Leslie Gelb, former director of the State Department's Politico-Military Affairs Bureau.

Winston Lord, president of the council, said: "The three men were members of the council until the last moment. They did not want to cause a rift in opinions."

Despite this explanation, it appears that the dovish opinions of Kennan and the others were overridden in a clash of views over the Soviet Union.

In a recent treatise, Kennan writes that during the past 30 years misunderstanding and mutual distrust between the US and the Soviet Union never grew to such an extent that both countries had to pour all their energies into military affairs.

It is not only Kennan that holds that opinion. Paul Warnke, former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Frank Church, former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, believe that US-Soviet coexistence depends on a resumption of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).

But their voices are drowned by the daily vociferous clamor over the "Soviet threat."

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger virtually makes it a rule to mention the Soviet threat in the same context as the military expansion of the Nazis.

"The Soviet Union is behaving in the same manner as the Axis Powers of Germany, Italy and Japan did when they invested huge sums in armaments with the aim of conquering the world. At that time, no one would listen to Churchill's appeals to Parliament," Weinberger said in a TV interview on September 28.

In the autumn of 1978, George Bush, then director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and now vice-president, formed "Team B" within the CIA. After sifting through the data collected by the CIA, this team became convinced of the existence of a Soviet threat.

"The people gradually realized there was a Soviet threat and this led to the inauguration of the present administration. In this sense the Soviet threat existed long before the present administration came into being," a State Department official said.

An important indication of President Reagan's attitude toward the Soviet Union is the fact that Paul Nitze, chief negotiator for the European nuclear arms control talks scheduled to begin in Geneva November 30, and Eugene Rostow, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, are both leading members of the Present Danger Committee that came into existence with Team B as the main promoter.

The term "Carterism" is often heard in Washington. Although there is some difference in nuance, the term generally seems to mean "timid or cowardly" toward the Soviet Union.

The US will pour huge sums of money into armaments over the next few years to improve its position vis-a-vis negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet threat theory certainly serves this purpose.

At present, the US cannot afford to consider vague steps toward negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Although Washington is permeated with an atmosphere of spite it can only stamp in frustration when it would dearly love to "stop the Russians." The Soviet threat theory may serve as an important "energy source" in achieving its ends.

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[24 Oct 81 p 1]

[Text] Where Does President Reagan's Strategy Lead To?

The Emperor visited Williamsburg, Virginia, on the first leg of his American tour back in 1975. The old city nestles in idyllic environs.

In mid-September, military experts from various countries huddled together in a city conference hall for the annual meeting of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Britain's authoritative research group. It was the first ever meeting held by the IISS on the American continent.

Many of the participants held key posts in charge of their governments' military or diplomatic affairs. Included among them were former US secretary of state Dr Henry Kissinger; Masataka Kosaka, a Kyoto University professor, and two other Japanese and South Koreans. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger had hurriedly flown into the city by helicopter to attend the meeting.

Divided into five panels, the participants were engaged in heated debates for full four days with the subjects ranging from the US and Soviet nuclear and conventional weapons to the balance of power and President Reagan's hard-line strategy.

However, both inside and outside the hall were heard whispers among the participants as they remained skeptical about Reagan's avowed policy of rebuilding the US forces.

It was openly pointed out that the US faced a host of problems, including its tight finances, inflation and the mounting opposition in Europe against US nuclear warfare.

Three weeks later, Reagan came out with fresh plans for a US strategy to counter the Soviet nuclear threat.

He announced that his administration planned to deploy 100 MX ICBMs, turn out 100 remodeled B1 strategic bombers and continue the construction of Trident missile submarines.

The most extensive of its kind since the Eisenhower administration, the Reagan plan is designed to substantially update the three basic means of transporting nuclear warheads.

With the new strategy, the Reagan administration believes, the US will be able to neutralize any conceivable buildup of nuclear arms by the Soviet Union.

It says that such plans, spreading over the next six years, would entail an outlay of \$180 billion, or roughly 12 percent of an estimated \$1,500 billion in the total defense budget for the same period.

Reagan later had to slash the spending by about \$13 billion on account of financial difficulties.

Thus it is already feared that the scheduled completion of a US military base in Egypt in 1983 is likely to be delayed for two years. The base is to serve as a US stronghold in Mideast.

The US Navy too may not be able to secure as many P3C antisubmarine reconnaissance planes as it originally sought.

The slash, however, was favorably received in the US media. One paper pointed out that Reagan had managed to trim financial authorities' earlier demand for a cut of \$30 billion to \$13 billion.

Former state secretaries Harold Brown and James Schlesinger had said that Reagan should not have talked big.

They feared that the reduction of the defense spending might cause a stir among the American allies.

but the favorable comment in the mass media obviously helped allay their apprehensions.

Yet US economic circles warned that Reagan's massive defense spending might trigger a new round of inflation.

In Europe, his "daredevil" approach was rather coolly followed.

The question is: Where Reagan's policy is leading to?

"Democratic liberals tend to make a conceptual approach to the problem of strategy," said Kissinger as he tried to analyze the impact of the Reagan strategy.

"They examine first of all what they can do with arms available, and will try to secure additional arms only after they have arrived at a conclusion that they will not be able to withstand a war with currently available weapons," said Kissinger.

"Republican conservatives, on the other hand, try to secure whatever weapons they consider useful regardless of whether currently available weapons can be still used, otherwise, they do not feel easy," he said.

For the immediate future, Dr Christoph Bertram, head of the IISS, tends to paint a grim picture of the Reagan strategy but as he discusses it as a long-range approach, his tone turns upbeat.

The US seems to have a set pattern as it has to handle a major problem. At least, that's been the case so far, he indicated.

Washington customarily issues many statements and in the process its strategy begins to take solid shape. Now the US aims to take leadership in the West but it would be some time before the Americans can achieve the objective, he remarked.

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[25 Oct 81 p 1]

[Text] Soviet Invasion of Hokkaido Considered Highly Unlikely

Members of Japan's defense forces and US Forces, Japan, had no opportunity to discuss the "Soviet threat" until two of three years ago, which in the words of US officers was "rather strange."

The officers pointed out that the provisions of the Japan-US security treaty call for cooperation between the two forces in resisting a limited foreign invasion, pending the arrival of US troops.

Contact between the two forces began only after the two countries agreed in 1978 on the Guideline for Japan-US Defense Cooperation, which included an article calling for an exchange of information necessary for Japan's defense.

The two forces have had contacts in a number of ways since then, one of them being a regular meeting between intelligence chiefs.

At one of these meetings, when the prospect of a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido was discussed, a US officer surprised Japanese participants by remarking, "The Soviets will never invade Hokkaido."

The officer was supported by other US participants who ignored the remonstrations of the chief of Japan's Office of J2 (Intelligence). The Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) reportedly expressed its an-

noyance after this meeting.

Although its view remains basically the same, the US side has toned down its statements, most probably after "political talks" between the two countries.

Apparently because it does not believe the Soviets will invade Hokkaido, the US has been urging Japan to primarily strengthen its Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF).

A large map, quite unlike ordinary maps seen in Japan, hangs in the room of a high-ranking official of the US Defense Department.

The Arctic Ocean is in the center of the map, flanked by the Soviet Union and North America. The Pacific Ocean is at the bottom.

The Soviet Union is shown virtually surrounded with Canada and the US to the right, Europe and the Middle East at the top, China to the left and Japan at the bottom.

Most military specialists agree that if the Soviet Union feels besieged or plans to expand its hegemony, the Soviets will probably invade the Middle East since this will give them a geographical advantage and cause the greatest impact on the Western powers.

In explaining the map, the Pentagon official said, "The Middle East might be the major front in a war but the Soviet Union could

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also establish another front in the Far East to shake up its adversaries. Under the circumstances, however, the opening up of a war front in the Far East by the Soviets would only be a secondary affair.

"Frankly speaking, there is no need for the Soviets to invade such a super-power such as Japan. Cut its sea-lanes? No, there's no need for that either.

"It only has to interfere slightly with the sea-lanes and that's enough. Oil supplies will come to a halt. Japan will no longer be able to export its products and its economic activities will be frozen. The Japanese people will panic because of these developments.

"It's all up with us. It's all over," the Japanese will say. The political system will begin to collapse. Perhaps these developments are what Soviet threats mean to Japan."

UN statistics reveal that of the 3.6 billion tons of goods shipped throughout the world last year, one-sixth or 620 million tons of these goods were unloaded in Japan, compared with 580 million tons and 150 million tons unloaded in the US and Soviet Union, respectively.

These figures give eloquent proof that the sea-lanes are indeed the lifeline for Japan, a fact that any potential enemy of this country might take advantage of.

One State Department official said testily that he used to tell visiting Japanese Dietmen, "The defense of the sea-lanes is up to Japan."


One typical question raised by the Dietmen, he said, was whether the 7th Fleet was capable of defending the sea-lanes.

"No one knows what form the Soviet threat will take," the official said. "The Soviet Union's plans will only become known when they resort to some kind of action. On top of this, it is difficult to understand why the Japanese remain so cheerful when one takes into account that Japan is geographically closer to the Soviet Union than any other Western ally and that Japan's northern territories are still occupied by the Soviets."

A congressional military affairs expert claimed that the Japanese were surprisingly "naïve."

A year ago, it was feared that the strategic Strait of Hormuz would close because of the Iran-Iraq conflict. If it had closed, what action would Japan have taken? Would Japan have done nothing even if its economy had started to grind to a halt?

There is a loud debate over the so-called Soviet threat, a debate that smells of war, but an important ingredient is missing.



THIS map hangs in a room of a high-ranking US Defense Department official. The room is the hub of US global strategy.

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[26 Oct 81 p 1]

[Text] 'Besieging' of Soviet Union Leads to Excessive Defense

"What is your image of the Soviet Union?"

When a Japanese is asked this question, his answer will invariably be, "A strange, immense country in the north with powerful armed forces."

The same answer may come from Afghans, Iranians, Turks as well as people from Western countries bordering East European nations, which are Soviet military outposts.

These people live in a stretch of land from the Far East to the European continent that forms a new moon half encircling the Soviet Union.

For many years these people have looked north with a vague feeling of unease.

Russians too have looked at Asia Minor and western Asia flanking southern Russia with a yearning for the mild climate and historic culture there.

What makes the Russians feel uneasy are the US military bases in these regions, with missiles aimed at Moscow.

Moreover, eastern Asia is inhabited by one billion Chinese who are a cipher to the Russians, primarily because of the geographical isolation of the two countries.

The situation in the region does not appear stable because China has "invaded" Vietnam from time to time.

Japan, an industrial superpower familiar to everyone because of its electrical appliances, is also apparently rebuilding its military strength after being pressured by the Reagan administration.

Then what image do the Soviets have of countries either neighboring or near

the Soviet Union from the standpoint of security?

In order to find out I called on two leading Soviet figures.

The first thing I learned was that the north did not enter into the picture since the northern areas were not inhabited.

What they are really concerned with are the east, west and south.

They stress that US military bases are located in these three regions where unfriendly countries or potential enemy countries form an encircling net. They therefore feel besieged.

The opposing camps feel threatened by the other side but the main point is that this fear is now deep-seated.

I called on Yuri Zukov, a political critic for Pravda who is influential in Soviet media, carrying "Soviet Military Power," a report recently released by the US Defense Department.

Catching sight of the report, Zukov chuckled and said, "I know that kind of stuff is being published or released almost daily. But it is a waste of money and labor. It is absolutely no use at all in easing tensions because only a few people in the West believe it."

"I cannot ignore part of the report that says as many as 75 SS20 strategic missiles have been deployed in Asia," I retorted, "and that Japan is the target for these missiles. Considering your position, aren't you informed of this deployment?"

Zukov replied jokingly, "I cannot reveal classified information from the Soviet

Staff Office."

Then more seriously, he said, "The Soviet Union has never taken the initiative in the postwar rearmament race. The US has always presented a challenge and, out of sheer necessity, we have been compelled to rearm for the sake of defense. I hope you will remember the historical background."

In order to convey to his countrymen the idea that they are under siege, Zhukov, who is also a noted TV commentator, addresses the following questions:

Which country, the US or the USSR, refused to ratify the second round of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)? Who decided to manufacture the neutron bomb? Which nation, the US or the Soviet Union, has brought up the concept of a limited, localized nuclear war? Is Washington really sincere about the forthcoming Geneva talks (from November 30) after choosing delegation members who are opposed to SALT II, especially when one takes into account the fact that it was forced to start negotiations after being pressured by its European allies?

How then can Moscow justify its invasion of Afghanistan with the sense of being besieged?

Retired Maj Gen Kozlov, who is a military commentator for Novosti Press Agency, gives this account:

"Under the previous Amin administration, the US influence suddenly increased. It became evident that part of our border in central Asia was being threatened. There was a strong possibility of a US military base being built in Afghanistan unless the Soviet Union provided military assistance. As

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pointed out by Communist Party General Secretary Brezhnev, Washington should have found a pretext other than Afghanistan to criticize Moscow."

Are the Soviets authorized to invade its neighbors if only a threat exists in such countries?

These countries, stretching from Asia to Europe, are inhabited by two billion people.

These people view Soviet military interference as excessive defense and Moscow has not yet given a convincing explanation to change their minds.



THIS MAP indicates why the Soviets feel besieged. Shaded region represents the Soviet Union and East Europe while black areas include the US, other Western countries and China. Stars represent US military bases.

[21 Oct 81 p 1]

[Text] 'Rear Economy' Keeps Soviet Forces in Field

From Czarist times until recently, the Russians have maintained the world's largest army but its effectiveness is another matter. One view is that the army is only 60 percent operational while another holds that it faces problems in obtaining supplies and reinforcements.

These views, which must have been supported by some facts, in essence suggest that the huge Russian army is a mere facade.

But Western military experts were both surprised and impressed when they saw the recent "West 81" maneuvers by the Soviet Army on their TV screens.

The landing exercise, the most extensive ever staged

by the Soviet Army since World War II, was carried out in the Baltic Sea in early September.

The stern of a 13,000-ton assault landing ship opened wide to disgorge amphibious armored cars and hovercraft. The hovercraft showed a remarkable turn of speed.

MI24 attack helicopters flew at a low altitude strafing "enemy" positions while paratroops floated to the ground. Armored trucks were also dropped with reverse rockets igniting only one or two meters above ground to soften the impact.

Western military experts commented that the exer-

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else was significant in that it demonstrated the Soviet Army's "mastery" over all techniques needed to fight a modern war.

On the other hand, there are some who view with skepticism the "supremacy" of Soviet troops.

They point to the Soviet Echo-type nuclear-powered submarine that caught fire off Okinawa in August last year. Although the cause of the fire is not known, the incident is believed by some people to reflect the poor ability of Soviets in operating and maintaining modern machines.

This event was linked to the 37,000-ton Minsk, an antisubmarine aircraft carrier, which failed to emerge from Vladivostok after being delivered there. Rumors included a mechanical breakdown, a shortage of spare parts and the crash of a YAK36, a VTOL, on the flattop.

T64 and T72 tanks, which form the core in the Soviet ground forces, are also reportedly suffering from some defects, including narrow seats and resultant fatigue of crewmen, due to poor design.

Some Western observers hopefully believe that these tanks, which send tremors through NATO forces, will become scrap iron after production of the neutron

bomb.

However, these views have been expressed out of a long-standing desire to reduce the huge strength of the Soviet forces as much as possible.

Asked to comment on the performance of Soviet anti-tank missiles, a Western military attache said, "They are surprisingly excellent." He praised the trajectory, velocity and accuracy of the missiles.

Another Western expert said that Soviet planes were well maintained. "We cannot belittle them," he added.

After living in Moscow for some time, I have begun to feel there are two different economic systems in the Soviet Union.

One, which may be called the surface economy, is marked by both the shortage and poor quality of daily necessities as well as inefficient labor, lack of discipline and red tape. Tourists are affected by this side of the economy.

The other is a military economic system supported by more than 10 percent of gross national product (GNP). In this economy, priority is given to funds, personnel, labor and materials, thus making it possible to turn out arms often superior to those of Western countries.

I met a middle-aged female clerk employed by a military electronics la-

boratory and was surprised to learn that she earned 500 rubles (about \$150,000) a month. The average monthly salary is about 170 rubles while university professors are paid 400 rubles a month.

Of course, no Russian critic has ever denied that all people suffer equally from the burden of heavy military spending.

The hard-line policy of President Reagan is aimed at making the Soviet economy deteriorate.

But retired Maj-Gen Kozlov, military commentator for Novosti Press Agency, said 20 million Soviets were killed in World War II and the people were half-starved as they toiled to rehabilitate their ruined country. However, the period was constantly marked by challenges from the US in the arms race and yet the Soviets coped with the situation, he added.

Now, he said, the Soviet Union was several times more powerful than in the days just after the war and "I would not believe anyone who says the Soviet Union cannot meet another challenge from the US."

It is surprising how patient the Soviet people are as they support the military economy, which may be called the "rear economy," while enduring all kinds of inconvenience in their daily lives.

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[29 Oct 81 p 1]

[Text] Soviet Union Considers Far East Military 'Weak Point'

"Japan really is a dreadful country, although the Japanese are good-natured and kind people," a middle-aged woman Russian language teacher told my wife suddenly.

My wife thought she was joking but the woman, who speaks Japanese and has some knowledge of Japan's current affairs, was serious.

She quoted a Soviet TV network as saying that Japan was promoting a militarization program in conspiracy with the US and China. The broadcast also claimed that Japan was expected to start a war to recapture the Kurile Islands, she said.

My wife told her tutors. "What the Japanese are afraid of is completely opposite to what you have said." She added that she realized how difficult it was to reach mutual understanding between the two countries.

Smiling wryly, a Soviet specialist of Japanese affairs said that after he told a Soviet audience recently that Japan's militarization was limited, members of that audience complained that they heard a completely different story on TV.

It appears, therefore, that reports from Tokyo correspondents criticizing Japan are yielding unexpected effects on Soviet TV viewers.

A film depicting an annual military review of Japanese defense forces is telecast daily, giving the impression that military parades are an everyday occurrence in Japan.

Consequently, it also appears that the Soviet people are being told of the need to build up their country's armed forces in preparation against not only China but Japan too.

Asked to comment on this, Yuri Zukov, a political critic for Pravda, did not deny it.

But he did deny allegations that the Soviet Union faced a threat from Japan. The Soviet authorities have never said there was such a threat, he added.

Other questions concerned the Soviet military buildup in the Far East, including the deployment of an assault landing ship in Far Eastern waters that could apparently only be used for a landing operation in Japan and the deployment of 130-mm artillery with a range of 27 kilometers on Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands, another obvious threat.

The alleged deployment of SS20s in China was tantamount to putting a dagger at the throat of Japan and China, I told Zukov.

He said there was no need for Japan to fear the Soviet Union since his country "views Japan as an important economic partner and there is no likelihood that the Far East will become a major war front first."

"If the Soviet Union has to attack Japan," he continued, "it would have to attack US bases in Japan first. This would lead to another world war and therefore the Soviet Union could not do this."

His argument is quite significant since it corresponds closely with the US view.

The US insists that Soviet pressure on Japan is mostly of a "political" nature and that there was no likelihood the Soviet Union would invade Japan.

The Soviets claim that

the SS20s are not aimed at Japan but at a country representing a threat to the Soviet Union.

Retired Maj Gen Kozlov, a military commentator for Novosti Press Agency, said, "The US has military bases in Japan and its submarines in Japanese waters carry sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) aimed at the heart of the Soviet Union. China too has begun to build up a similar strength. It is therefore necessary for the Soviet Union to shift its military forces around and carry out exercises designed to show the US and its allies, Japan and China, that the Soviet Union has its own decisive deterring power."

However, he did not deny that SS20s were deployed in the Far East.

The interviews with Zukov and Kozlov gave this correspondent the impression that the Soviets believed the Reagan administration was trying to "lay a chain" along the Soviet border, by integrating the US, China, Japan and South Korea into a military alliance as well as reorganizing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) into a military bloc.

The Soviets bitterly condemned China for providing the US with sites to collect information, for being a US ally and for its anti-Soviet military policy that they said posed a threat to the Soviet Union on a global scale.

Western military sources believe the Soviet military buildup in the Far East is interlocked with Chinese actions.

They say that the deployment of a division of troops on four northern is-

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lands claimed by Japan was in response to the conclusion of the Japan-China friendship treaty.

The deployment of another five Soviet divisions along the Chinese border was designed to deter China from invading Vietnam again.

The deployment of the SS20s was to counter the strengthening of military cooperation between the US and China.

In the eyes of the Soviets, the Far East is still a "weak point," they pointed out, adding that a full-fledged arms race was about to begin in the Far East.

Then what role will Japan play?

The Soviet Union claims that the US is increasing its pressure on Japan to assume a greater role in the US' global strategy and

the Chinese are also trying to plant anti-Soviet sentiment among the Japanese.

There are already dangerous signs that Japan is responding positively to the US and Chinese overtures, it says.

"It is certain that the US will attack the Soviet Union in the Far East to cripple Soviet military power there, regardless of where a war between the Soviet Union and the US breaks out—in Europe or the Middle East," the Soviets say. "This will mean that there is no such thing as a limited nuclear war. It is therefore hard for us to imagine how Japan can avoid war because it is a US ally. We are closely watching what course the Japanese take from now on."

The "armor" of our northern neighbor is becoming harder and thicker.

[30 Oct 81 p 1]

[Text] U.S. Govt Awaiting Post-Brezhnev Era in Moscow

Conservative US Senator Henry Jackson has a theory that equates the Soviet Union with a hotel thief. According to this theory, the thief knocks on the doors of the hotel rooms one after another until he finds one that is unlocked and then enters the room without hesitation.

He says the failure of the Afghans and their friends to lock the door allowed the Soviets to invade Afghanistan and the only effective way to counter Soviet ambitions of this type is through military power.

Jackson's view is just one of many strong American opinions about the Soviet Union that appear to be rather emotional.

Ten months have passed since the inauguration of the Reagan administration and a study of develop-

ments in US-Soviet relations during this period give the impression that the US Government is playing for time.

The Reagan administration believes that full-fledged negotiations between Washington and Moscow cannot begin until Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev departs from the scene and the US is working out its strategy accordingly.

It is obvious from Reagan's speeches and movements that he does not want to meet Brezhnev until the US gains the upper hand in military strength as a result of the current desperate efforts to institute a new rollback policy.

Rumors, mostly from CIA sources, are rife in Washington that Brezhnev is suffering from throat cancer, a heart disease or a circula-

tory ailment and that his condition is deteriorating.

A George Washington University professor, an expert in Soviet affairs, says it will not be strange if Brezhnev retires within one year for health reasons.

Has the Reagan administration, therefore, forsaken the Brezhnev administration as a partner in negotiations? This may not be true judging from negotiations between the two countries in the 1970s.

Of course, Moscow under Brezhnev's leadership adopts a hard line in negotiations but, at the same time, it is reliable.

However, there is no guarantee that a dovish leader will succeed Brezhnev. His successor might adopt policies undesirable to Washington, such as building up armaments to coun-

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ter the US and taking stronger internal measures.

It will take the US at least four or five years to rebuild its strategic forces as well as communication and transport systems, necessary steps to stop Soviet expansionism in the name of assisting foreign liberation forces.

There is also no guarantee that the Brezhnev administration will remain in office while the US rebuilds its forces. This means the US has no alternative but to play for time and this additionally has given the Reagan administration a headache.

With two months to go before the end of the year, only two major meetings were scheduled between the US and the Soviet Union this year. One was the meeting between US Secretary of State Alexander Haig and his Soviet counterpart Andrei Gromyko at the UN headquarters in New York last month and the other is a meeting on theater nuclear weapons in Europe scheduled next month in Geneva.

Moreover, US-Soviet relations have been rocky over the past 10 months.

For instance, Professor Georgi Arbatov, head of the Institute of US Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in Moscow, had his application to renew his visa turned down by US authorities. He is popular among American citizens for his friendly attitude to-

ward the US.

At Washington's Dulles Airport, a Soviet airliner was inspected by US officials on suspicion that it was carrying smuggled articles, allegedly military machinery.

Under the circumstances, a US-Soviet summit may not be held until sometime after next summer, contrary to rumors following the inauguration of the Reagan administration that such a meeting would be held by the end of this year.

A Columbia University professor recently wrote in a thesis, entitled "Soviet Policy in the 1980," that the Brezhnev age was coming to an end.

He called on US leaders to prepare themselves for an age where they would have to negotiate with a Soviet leader, a generation younger than Brezhnev, who would have only a limited knowledge about foreign countries and would initially concentrate on domestic affairs.

It is difficult at present to predict who will succeed Brezhnev, but it is certain that the new leader's connection with the Soviet armed forces will not be as firm as Brezhnev's and there will be a greater opportunity for the US to negotiate with Moscow because he will be concerned with improving the living standards of Soviet citizens.

The Reagan administration has made its policy to build up its arms abundantly clear to the Soviet Union but its foreign policy toward Moscow lacks perspective and is virtually marking time.

The pitfall in US policy toward the Soviet Union arises from the simple theory that the Soviet Union is a "bad country" which is likely to wage nuclear war, while it turns a deaf ear to Soviet thought and psychology.

A general, who is a top-ranking official in the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), recently told a meeting at the Woodrow Wilson International Studies Center that an analysis of Soviet military manuals shows the training of Soviet troops in preparation for a nuclear war far more complete than the counterpart in the US.

In the US today, there is absolutely no sympathetic consideration that US pressure in the nuclear warfare field may have triggered heated debates within the Kremlin.

The US may be likened to one of Aesop's fables since it depends too much on the north wind and virtually ignores the utilization of the sun's heat. It appears the weak points in Reagan's Soviet strategy lie in this point.

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[31 Oct 81 p 1]

[Text] Japan Caught Between Washington, Moscow Offensives

President Reagan is trying hard to strengthen US war potential, and Japan is already feeling its effect.

One military specialist in Congress, who is well informed of the developments in Japan, says that barring a drastic turnaround in Tokyo policy, Japan may not be able to play a military role as hoped for by the Reagan administration.

"If Japan were to meet the US demand, its defense spending would easily exceed two percent of Japan's gross national product (GNP), not just over one percent.

How best the US demand will be met within Japan's current framework?

"Perhaps, the best and most practical way is to re-order priorities. Firstly, the US would have the Japanese Maritime and Air Self-Defense forces beef up their strength. By the mid-1980s, they would be ready, if need be, to block the Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima straits, and to safeguard Japan's sea-lanes. Their capability would be further built up so that they would defend Japan's air space."

Last June when a Japan-US working level meeting on security was held in Hawaii, the US came out with a fresh demand for greater Japan defense capability, especially in promptly meeting and countering foreign aggression for a sustained period of time.

In Washington, it is believed, President Reagan has not yet finalized his Japan policy, though.

Observers say, "State Department officials are behaving themselves as if there is a well-defined blueprint. Chances are a clear-cut concept on US demands for a greater Japanese role may not surface

until toward the end of this year or early next spring."

Of course, Japan's "free riding" on the US security setup is still being much talked about.

It shouldn't be surprising if Americans, well aware of Japan's economic strides as evidenced by its booming auto exports, are to put forward a still harsher demand for greater Japanese defense spending as an answer to what they regard as the mounting pressure from Japanese marketing inroads.

How has the Reagan warning on the "Soviet threat" been received in Japan?

"I think that the theory is a little exaggerated. Perhaps, the Reagan administration wanted to emphasize the Russian threat in Congress. As I see it, the US is still superior to the Soviets in both nuclear and conventional weapons," says Masamichi Inoki, professor emeritus of Kyoto University and president of the Research Institute for Peace and Security.

Inoki continues:

"It is true the Soviet military power has been considerably strengthened. But it seems everything else goes amiss with the Soviets. We can hear the Russians complaining loud and bitter. They've suffered poor grain crops for three years in a row. Moscow has been unable to ease Poland's food crisis.

The Afghan situation remains unstable. Overall, the outlook is far from rosy for the Soviets in long terms."

Kou Maruyama, former administrative deputy director-general of the Defense Agency, is one of many who maintains the "threat from Moscow, linked to the growing Soviet military might, may not be as

serious as warned by the US."

"An adherent of power, the Soviets are excessively concerned with national security. Their original conception was to defend themselves against foreign aggression rather than expand their territories.

"Russia as a military behemoth may be looked on as a menace. But remember that country has its own tender spots—its economy, welfare, etc.

"Indeed, the Soviet military buildup around areas close to Japan should be taken as part of an effort to defend the country from a possible foreign attack. It doesn't have to be taken as Soviet military preparedness designed specifically against the Far East."

Japan has turned itself into an industrial power with the highest technological level and excellent human resources, leading military specialists to regard it as a potential military superpower.

What's the Soviet intention in the circumstances?

"Moscow apparently wants Tokyo to cut its close ties with Washington and Peking. If possible, it wants to throw a monkey wrench into their relations.

"Moscow might try to play Japan against the US and China, and launch a diplomatic offensive to create an anti-American and anti-Chinese climate in Japan. The Soviets might also try to stop a further expansion in Japan's military power."

Meanwhile some Defense Agency officials point out that Washington has modified its global strategy following the Japan-US conference in Hawaii in June.

American delegates to the conference told the Japanese

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counterparts that Russian military strength has grown to such an extent that they would be able to launch invasions simultaneously in the Mideast, Europe and Asia, asking for a boost in Japanese preparedness to resist such an invasion for a sustained period of time, thus assuming greater responsibility for Japan's own defense.

The Japanese were also told that the US would temporarily concentrate on the defense of the Middle East, and the American military presence in the Japan area would inevitably thin out."

The remarks suggested

the difficulty for Japan to rely on US reinforcements in case of war though they formed a major pillar of the Japan-US security treaty.

Indications are the Reagan administration would more determinedly push for Japan's defense buildup toward the end of the year or early next spring.

At the same time, the Moscow drive to wean the Japanese away from Washington policy will likely intensify.

Thus Japan will find itself caught between the two superpowers with the climate surround it getting still severer.

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